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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM

...

January 5, 1979 Conference
List 3, Sheet 2
No. 78-575
SOUTHERN

v.
SEABOARD

Cert to CA 8
(Gibson, Van Oosterhout & Matthes)
ET AL.

Federal/Civil

Timely by extn

No. 78-597
INTERSTATE

Same

v.
SEABOARD ALLIED

Federal/Civil

Timely by extn

No. 78-604
SEABOARD COAST LINE

CO., ET AL.

Same

v.
SEABOARD ALLIED MILLIN

CO., ET AL.

Federal/Civil

Timely by extn
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SUMMARY:

Petitioners in these curve-lined cases challenge

the CA's holding that it had jurisdiction to review the ICC's
refusal to investigate the lawfulness of a proposed tariff that
respondent claimed was patently violative of several sections
of the Interstate
FACTS:

Co~merce

Act.

Other than the ICC, the petitioners in these

curve-lined cases are railroads who filed proposed rate
increases with the ICC.

Respondents are shippers, private

associations and governmental agencies, including the United
States Department of Agriculture, which protested the proposed
increases to the ICC.
The tariffs filed by petitioners proposed a
limited-duration, 20% seasonal surcharge on the shipment of
specified grains in several midwestern and southeastern
States.

The rate increases were to apply only between

September 15 and December 15, 1977.

Such seasonal surcharges

were authorized by Section 202(d) of the Railroad
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 [the 4-R Act],
49 U.S.C.

§

15(17), and regulations promulgated by the ICC

thereunder, 49 C.F.R.

§

1109.10.

Respondents alleged . the proposed tariffs were unreasonable,
discriminatory and patently violative of Sections 1(5), 2,
3(1), 4(1) and 15(17) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49
§§

1(5), 2, 3(1), 4(1) and 15(17).

u.s.c.

They asked the ICC either

to reject the tariffs as patently unlawful or to suspend them
until an investigation was made into their lawfulness under
Section 15 (8) (a) of the Act.
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By order issued September 14, 1977, Division II denied the
respondents' petition to reject the proposed tariffs.

In a

separate order issued the same day, the full Commission
declined to suspend the tariffs or to open an investigation
under Section 15(8) (a).

It found the respondents' evidence

offered in support of alleged violations of the Act
insufficient to warrant such action, noted that Congress
intended to authorize experimentation with seasonal rate-making
in passing Section 202(d) of the 4-R Act, and observed that the
complaint sections of the Act protect the interests of any
party adversely affected by the rates.

The Commission

therefore determined to "permit this temporary adjustment to

c

become effective."
Respondent Seaboard Allied Milling then obtained from the
CA a temporary judicial stay of the ICC's orders refusing to
reject or suspend the tariffs.

TheCA, however, vacated its

stay order after a hearing, but directed the railroads to
maintain sufficient records to permit determination of
overcharges in the event that the complainants prevailed on
review.

The ICC then issued an order permitting the railroads

to implement the tariff on one day's notice with provision made
for the recordkeeping directed by the CA.

The tariffs then

went into effect.
On appeal, the principal issue presented was whether the CA
had jurisdiction to entertain a petition for review of the ICC
orders refusing to reject or suspend the proposed tariffs and
to open an investigation under Section 15(8) (a).
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HOLDING BELOW:

Observing that there was respectful

authority that it had no jurisdiction to review the ICC's
refusal to suspend the proposed tariffs, and that the period
covered by the tariffs had long since expired anyway, the CA
found it unnecessary to decide whether it had any jurisdiction
to review the no-suspension order.

The protective orders

issued by the ICC and the court had mooted the practical import
of that issue in any event.
The CA then framed the question presented on whether it had
jurisdiction to review the propriety of ICC's termination of
its investigation into the lawfulness of the proposed tariffs.
The court held that such jurisdiction existed in the "peculiar
circumstances of this case" where a substantial question of the
tariffs' patent illegality had been presented and those charges
had not been adequately investigated by the ICC.
In so holding, the CA principally relied on City of Chicago
v. United States, 396 U.S. 162 (1969), which holds that an ICC
decision to terminate a Section 13a(l) investigation is a final
order subject to judicial review.

Jurisdiction to review an

ICC decision not to pursue an investigation was also supported
by

Alton Railroad Co. v. United States, 287

(1932) •

u.s.

229, 236-37

The Court acknowledged that Arrow Transportation Co.

v. Southern Railway Co., 372 U.S. 658, 667-68 (1963), supported
the view that the Court had no power to review the Commission's
refusal to suspend the proposed tariffs.

However, theCA

believed that the ICC's suspension and investigation powers
I

were separate and distinct.

And, the factors prompting
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Arrow's holding that suspension orders were not reviewable did
not apply to ICC orders refusing to make, or terminating, an
investigation of the lawfulness of a proposed tariff.
Here, the shippers had made substantial charges that the
tariffs proposed were patently violative of the long-haul,
short-haul clause of section 4(1) of the Act, as well as other
provisions of the statute.

The ICC had a duty not to permit

unlawful tariffs to go into effect and had failed to make an
adequate investigation of the section 4(1) and other violations
alleged.

Disagreeing with the CA DC's conclusion in Asphalt

Roofing Mfr.'s Ass'n v. ICC, 567 F.2d 994 (1977), that ICC
decisions not to pursue an investigation are under all
circumstances not final decisions subject to judicial review,
the CA 8 reasoned that the ICC's failure to investigate the
charges of patent illegality allowed the tariffs to go into
effect and was the equivalent of a finding that the tariffs
were lawful.

There was, thus, as much justification for

treating the ICC's termination of its investigation into the
shippers' claims of patent illegality as a final order subject
to review, as there was for this Court's holding in Aberdeen &
Rockfish R. Co. v. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 289, 318-19 (1975)1 that a
Commission decision to give no further consideration to
environmental factors in a general revenue proceeding was a
final order subject to review.
Moreover, significant policy reasons supported the court's
holding.

For, if the ICC's refusal to pursue an investigation

of the shippers' claims was unreviewable, their only recourse
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wouJ.d be to file complaints under section 13(1) after the rates
became effective.

And, in a section 13(1) proceeding, the

burden would be on the complainants to show the unlawfulness of
the rates; whereas, in a section 15(8) (a) proceeding initiated
by the Commission, the burden would be on the carriers to
establish the lawfulness and reasonableness of the proposed
tariffs.

Also, by permitting review of the Commission's

termination of its investigation, the need for ICC and judicial
consideration of numerous section 13(1) complaints initiated by
individual parties would be obviated.
CONTENTIONS:

Petitioners contend that the Court erred by

misconstruing the ICC's decision as an order terminating an
investigation, when in fact all the agency did was refuse to
( '-../

initiate an investigation under section 15 (8) (a).
Chicago case is, thus, directly on point.

The

City of

For, although

holding that a decision to terminate a previously opened
investigation was reviewable, it also held that a decision not
to open an investigation was unreviewable.
165-66;

396 U.S. at

accord, New Jersey v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 324,

329 (D.N.J. 1958), aff'd, 359

u.s.

27 (1959)

(refusal to open a

section 13a(l) investigation unreviewable).
This conclusion is also supported by Arrow and United
States v. SCRAP, 412

u.s.

669 (1973), which make clear that a

decision not to susperid a proposed tariff is unreviewable.

As

the DC Circuit reasoned in Asphalt Roofing, . because the
decision not to suspend a proposed tariff and the decision not
to open an investigation are two sides of the same coin,
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no-investigation orders are no more reviewable than
no-suspension orders.

Like the decision as to whether to

suspend a proposed tariff, the decision whether to investigate
its lawfulness is committed to the agency's unreviewable
discretion by section 15 {8) {a).
Petitioners further observe that the CA

e ~ red

in asserting

that an ICC decision not to investigate a proposed tariff
places the tariff in effect and is the equivalent of a finding
of lawfulness.

Not so.

It is the decision not to suspend the

tariff that permits it to go into

effect~

and, the decision not

to investigate is not a final determination that the particular
rates are just, reasonable or lawful.
692 n.l6.

Cf. SCRAP, 412

u.s.

at

The merits of respondents' charges of illegality and

unreasonableness, claim petitioners, can be finally determined
in a section 13{1) proceeding.

Under that section the ICC is

under a duty to investigate upon complaint of any aggrieved
party if any reasonable grounds are presented for an
investigation.
By permitting judicial review of the agency's refusal to
open a section 15(8) (a) investigation, theCA has seriously
disrupted the Commission's rate review process and violated all
of the principles underlying the doctrines of primary
jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Respondents answer that the CA's decision was correct and
consistent with longstanding case law.

They stress that this

is an unusual case because it involved petitions to reject and

...

\-~-

suspend the proposed tariffs on the ground that they were

l

-

(

0

-

patently violative of the long-haul, short-haul provisions of
section 4(1) and of other sections of the Act as well.

The

case was not processed as a routine suspension case wherein the
ICC allows a proposed tariff to take effect over protest
without issuing any order expressly authorizing the rates to
take effect.

Rather, the case was assigned to a formal docket

and transferred directly to the full Commission, which issued a
formal order allowing the rates to take effect.

For purposes

of this proceeding, the Commission's termination of its
investigation of alleged section 4(1) and other violations
finally disposed of the issues of patent illegality raised by
the petitions to reject and suspend.

The ICC was under an

affirmative duty not to permit tariffs containing fourth

C:

section violations to become effective, and the Commission
violated that duty by allowing the tariffs to take effect
without resolving the serious claims of patent illegality under
section 4(1) that had been raised.

Judicial review, thus, was

warranted under the rationale of the Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate
Cases, 98 S. Ct. 2053, 2058-59 n. 17 (1978), to ensure that the
Commission would not overstep the bounds of its statutory
authority.
Neither Arrow nor the DC Circuit's decision in Asphalt
Roofing are inconsistent with theCA 8's decision.

Those cases

hold only that refusals to suspend or to investigate the
reasonableness of rate increases are unreviewable.

They do not

insulate from review here the Commission's refusal to comply
with the requirements of section 4(1) by allowing tariffs

:
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containing unreviewed fourth section departures to take
effect.

Neither case dealt

the issues of patent

~ith

illegality raised herein, and the DC Circuit has recently cited
with approval the CA's decision at bar for the proposition that
a "Commission decision not to investigate a proposed tariff is
reviewable where a substantial issue of patent illegality has
been presented."

National Small Shipment Traffic Conference,

Inc. v. ICC, No. 78-1099, slip op. at 9 n.34 (D.C. Cir. Oct.
26, 1978).
&

[But see Reply of Southern R. Co., No. 78-575, at 3

n.3.]
The Solicitor General has filed a memorandum with the Court

urging that cert be granted.

Although conceding that Asphalt

Roofing is technically distinguishable in that it involved a
( -'

'-

general rate increase protested on grounds of unreasonableness
and no claims of patent illegality involving alleged fourth
section departures, the SG believes that Asphalt's reasoning
that the Commission's suspension and investigation powers are
inseparable is fundamentally inconsistent with the contrary
views expressed by the CA 8 here.

In view of the conflict and

the critical importance of questions bearing on the
reviewability of the ICC no-investigation orders, the SG urges
plenary review •
. The SG, however, disagrees with both the petitioners and
the respondents on the merits.

His position is that a

Commission decision not to open a section 15(8) investigation
is ultimately subject to judicial review but is not immediately
ripe for review.

The SG reasons that the decision not to open

a section 15(8) investigation does no more than determine who
shall bear the burden of persuasion, for the protestants can
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immediately file a section 13(1) complaint that the Commission
is under a duty to investigate.

At the close of the section

13(1) proceeding, the Commission's decision not to open a
section 15(8) investigation would be reviewable if the
allocation of the burden of persuasion were critical to the
outcome.
ANALYSIS:

Because this case involves what the CA

characterized as "substantial claims of patent illegality," its
decision may not be squarely in conflict with the DC Circuit's
decision in Asphalt Roofing or with any holding of this Court.
Nevertheless, the reasoning of such cases as Arrow, City of
Chicago, and Asphalt Roofing does support the petitioners'
contention that the courts of appeals have no jurisdiction to
review an ICC decision not to open a section 15(8) (a)
investigation into the lawfulness of a proposed tariff.

And,

the CA's characterization of the ICC's orders denying the
petitions to reject or suspend the tariffs as orders
terminating an investigation into the lawfulness of the
proposed tariffs seems questionable.
But, whatever one's view of the merits, this case presents
a question of first impression that may . well be of sufficient
import as to merit plenary review regardless of the existence
or non-existence of the conflicts alleged here.
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May 28, 1979

78-575 Southern Railway v. Seaboard

Dear John:
I

Please show on the next draft of your opinion that
took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Since r e lv,

Mr. Justice Stevens
lfp/ss
cc:

.

>

The Conference

.§n~ ~tnttt uf tqt )lnittb ~tatts'
~rut~~. <!J. 21lblJ1~

CHAMBERS OF

May 29, 1979

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

Re:

Nos. 78-575, 78-597 & 78-604 Southern Railway Co. v. Seaboard
Allied Milling Corp, etc.

Dear John,
With thanks, I join.
Sincerely yours,

lr~
Mr. Justice Stevens

Copies to the Conference
erne _

/

-

I

